10 Coincidences Between Two Different Objects

1. They Both Exist

One may exist only in the mind while the other exists in reality. Perhaps both are manifest in the physical world. Perhaps one, or both, cannot be conceived or exist physically but occupy a third potential space unavailable to the human mind or the physical world.

2. They Are Not The Same

It can be said of both things that they are not one, singular thing but are, in fact, two separate things, each with at least one characteristic, but perhaps several, that differentiate it from the other.

3. They Are Not Other Things

Neither of the two things are a singular separate third thing for, that third thing being separate i.e. differentiable from the first two things in some manner, it is not the same as either of the two things. [Editor’s Note: This actually pertains to a fourth separate thing as well, and a fifth, on and on to an infinite number of things that are not the two compared things. Not just a third.]

4. Despite Not Being The Same, They Share Similarities

While being differentiable in some manner, they are not differentiable in all manners. Certain traits are shared between both objects.

5. Certain Similarities Are Shocking And Thus Interesting

Some similarities are of obvious types or traits, such as ones a person might imagine would logically be shared between two objects. However, certain similarities are of either such a specific nature or are so unimportant to the class of object as a whole that they become easily forgotten or perhaps remain unknown. But, having remembered them, or learned of them for the first time, and comparing them between both objects, the very specific or unimportant traits are revealed to be either identical or very close, and thus because of the odds of this, are deemed interesting.

6. Many Of The Similarities Between Both Are Of No Importance

Though being similar, they are not actual important to any of the things one might traditionally associate with either object. The reader surmises perhaps they are listed to increase the number of listed coincidences to a round number. The reader further surmises, though perhaps only subconsciously, that data has been collated revealing lists get more hits when they feature a certain number of entries: perhaps 10-entry lists are clicked on most, 5-entry lists second, 3-entry lists third, etc., and that the writers and/or editors are aware of this data and are gearing their lists as such. Removing similarities of little to no importance to the causes for notability of both objects could possibly reduce the number of entries down to 0, though perhaps would not reduce them at all, depending on the coincidental traits listed.

7. The Observer Of The Objects Is Neither Of The Objects

The observer, by dint of the fact of observing both objects, makes itself differentiable from either object, which is by definition being observed and not observing the system itself. If the observer is observing itself in a mirror or attempting to frame itself as one of the objects, it will, by definition, fail; self-awareness, not being complete, means that the observer can never truly observer and thus mentally model itself. Instead, it can only model a fractional version of itself, approaching but not equaling 100% of its traits, and thus its attempted observation of itself is really an observation of a distinct form sharing some, and perhaps a great deal, but not all of the traits of the self attempting to observe. Thus the observer of the objects is, by definition, neither of the two objects being observed.

8. The Reader Of This List Is Neither Of The Two Objects

The reader, being an observer of the act of observation performed by the first observer of the two objects, is differentiated from the observer itself. The observer, being unable to identify precisely who is observing the list or, through the entropic passage of time, developing differentiable traits from the reader, even if they are mere age differences, finds itself different from the reader of the list. Furthermore, the observer, being incapable of 100% self-awareness, is likewise incapable of 100% speculative awareness, or complete knowledge of a potential observer, and thus, being incapable of perfectly identifying a single specific reader, cannot capture them as either of the two objects being compared. This, oddly enough, becomes a coincidental trait shared by both objects: neither, by definition, can be the reader of the list in which they are contained.

9. Certain Similarities Would Be Maintained If One Of The Objects Was Different

Through a combination of positive and negative attributes, i.e. that either object either possesses a trait or does not possess a trait, one can draw up a list of features of the object. The possession or dispossession of a trait is itself a trait outside of the trait being judged, just as possession or dispossession of a possession or dispossession of a trait, upward and upward. Should this same analysis be carried out on a third object, there would eventually be found a trait shared both by the initial two compared objects and the new, third object. Thus, the third object could be swapped for one of the two initial objects and one, if not more, similarities would be maintained. This applies for any given two starting objects and any given new, third object.

10. Both Objects Are Impossible To Perfectly Perceive

Given the impossibility of perfect self-awareness, any given observer cannot be perfectly aware of any given observed object, missing some detail/attribute/trait and thus forming an incomplete, differentiable model of the object. This model is itself a new object, being differentiable from the object attempted to be perceived by at least on trait, if not more. Any given observer thus will never perfectly observer either of the two objects. Furthermore, no observer will observe either of the two objects in the same way as another observer; each observer, even if it is the same observer attempting a second observation at a different time, will differ in some manner from the previous observer and, thus, derive different imperfect observations of the object, thus creating another unique observed model-object. The two observers can communicate their differences in observation to one another but, being incapable of perfect self-awareness, will never be perfectly self-aware of even the totality of the traits their model of the observed object possesses and, thus, will be incapable of communicating all the traits another observer would be required to observe to form an identical model. Thus, neither object can be perfectly perceived either by an observer alone or any number of observers working in conjunction, always differing in some manner from the true set of attributes of the observed model-object.

Langdon Hickman is a writer. He eats from sewers for fun. He drinks rainwater that pools in an old pickle bucket he keeps on his porch. His work has been published on WEAPONIZER, 365tomorrows, and FeedBuzz.